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STEVEN W. MOSHER: HEGEMON 
STUDY GUIDE, 2004-2006 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
PREFACE 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Why was the Chinese government embarrassed following 9-11?  What damaged U.S.- 
Chinese relations in September 1991?  What conclusions have been drawn by the Chinese 
leadership from Paul Kennedy’s imperial overstretch theory?  (vii-x) 
 
Review 
 
Paul Kennedy’s imperial overstretch theory   Chinese economy 
 
INTRODUCTION:  THE TIANANMEN TEMPTATION 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. How the development of a new middle class serve as a distraction?  From what? 
Distinguish between the Tiananmen generation and the one that has followed.  (xi-xv) 
 
Review 
 
new middle class  princelings   Defense White Paper, 1998 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  WESTERN BARBARIANS 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What role has the idea of hegemony played historically in China?  What was the Ba? 
What is the cultural significance of China’s self-conceit as the Middle Kingdom (Zhong Guo)?  
How were tributary states treated?  (1-3) 
 
2. How were Westerners treated initially?  What changed in the nineteenth century?  How 
did Mao Zedong express a sense of restored pride?  (4-6) 
 
3. Identify the three deathblows to the alliance of convenience between China and the 
United States.  What value did America have for China?  Why do the Chinese reject 
balance of power politics? What is behind Chinese criticism of American leading role in the 
world?  Identify the six factors of instability listed in the Defense White Paper?  How do the 
Chinese regard westernization?  (6-14) 
 
Review 
 
hegemony   the Ba    Zhong Guo 
desire for deference  Canton    sensitivity to slights   
deathblows to the pseudoalliance with the United States  balance of power rejected 
containment vs. engagement envy and balked ambition analysis of white paper 
factors of instability   
 
CHAPTER TWO:  BIRTH OF THE HEGEMON 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What purpose underlies “oriental despotism”?  How far back does Chinese absolutism go?  What 
does Son of Heaven imply?  How was power distributed in the Zhou (Chou) dynasty?  How were 
feudal obligations governed?  What role was played by the Duke Huan and by his prime minister, 
Guan Zhong?  What are the six powers?  During the Warring States period, who was Han Fei?  
What was the essence of Legalism?  What policies did the Legalists recommend?  (15-21) 
 
2. What was the effect of Legalist reforms during the Qin (Ch’in) dynasty?  Who was Qin Shihuang 
(Ch’in Shih Huang Ti) and what is notable about his rule: especially concerning his punishment of 
crimes, policy of aggressive expansion, and attitude about Confucian scholarship?  (21-26) 
 
3. What was the survival strategy of the Han dynasty?  What is ren?  Where did the Legalists and 
Confucians agree?  How did Confucianism become the empire’s official ideology?  How was it 
changed to fit the empire’s needs?  [This is the typical revolutionary strategy of preserving the 
traditional forms while changing their substance, similar to what Augustus did in Rome].  (26-29) 
 
4. How did the Han state assert hegemony in its foreign policy?  Identify some of the 
accomplishments of Han Wudi (Wu Ti = the martial emperor) and Ban Chao (Pan Ch’ao) [Ban 
Zhao was his famous sister].  The Roman empire was known to the Chinese as Da Qin (Ta Ch’in 
= the Great Ch’in).  How did the two empires in terms of control over the population, assimilation 
of conquered peoples, and cultural cohesion?  How did China expand during the Song and Yuan 
(Mongol) dynasties?  (29-33) 
 
5. What did Hong Wu, founder of the Ming dynasty, accomplish?  How was the Qing (Ch’ing) 
mandarinate organized?  What was the status of civil society?  How was hegemony asserted?  
How did the Emperor treat the British emissaries in 1792?  What were the consequences of the 
Opium War?  (33-36) 
 
Review 
 
Shang dynasty   zong fa    Duke Huan 
Guan Zhong   Legalists   six powers 
Han Fei    Legalist policies   Qin Shihuang’s policies 
ideology of Han dynasty  Han civil service  Roman citizenship 
Han cultural homogeneity Qing mandarinate  Opium War 
later dynasties: Sui-Tang, Song, Yuan (Mongol), Ming, Qing (Manchu) 
 
CHAPTER THREE:  THE HEGEMON REAWAKENS 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. How does Mosher make the case that Mao was an emperor in the Legalist tradition and 
that Marxism-Leninism was well-adapted to its role supporting hegemony?  How did he 
maintain the cult of the emperor and restore the Mandate of Heaven?  How was the 
autocratic tradition of the imperial state continued?  (37-44) 
 
2. What three stratagems were recommended by Zhou Enlai?  Was led to conflict with the Soviet 
Union?  How did China begin to reassert traditional prerogatives over former vassal states?  
What caused the Sino-Soviet split?  (44-49) 
 
3. How did China take over Tibet?  How did it justify the intervention?  [René Girard’s The 
Scapegoat shows that standard justifications for persecution reveal similar patterns of 
accusation].  Describe Nehru’s experiences with Chinese treachery.  How did China attempt to 
expand its influence in Southeast Asia?  How did the Eisenhower Administration respond to 
Chinese threats against Taiwan?  (49-59)  
 
Review 
 
Mao Zedong   Marxism-Leninism  democracy vs. communism 
features of Communist state Zhou Enlai’s three stratagems relationship with Stalin 
Khrushchev’s secret speech sinicization of Tibet  attack on India 
Taiwan    Chiang Kai-shek  China’s bloody borders 
 
CHAPTER FOUR:  GREAT HAN CHAUVINISM 
 
Outline 
 
A. MAO’S FAILURES  (61-63) 
1. Incessant Political Campaigns: Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution 
2. Reunification Goal 
3. Asia Dominated by Two Powers 
a. Unresolved Irredentist Claims 
b. Russian Far East 
4. Mao’s Primal Mistake 
a. Inadequacy of Communism for Legalist Program 
5. Economic Setbacks   
B. THE “FOUR MODERNIZATIONS”  (63-65) 
1. Mao’s Views Have Not Been Repudiated 
2. Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiao-ping] 
a. Disastrous Great Leap Forward of the 1960s Had Sought to Eradicate 
Selfishness through Forced Collectivization 
b. Arrest of Deng and Liu Shaoqi at Beginning of the Cultural Revolution 
3. Deng’s Confession 
4. Deng’s Rehabilitation [He Was Called “Lazarus” Afterwards] 
a. Collaboration with Zhou on Four Modernizations 
5. Material Incentives 
a. Internal Exile 
6. Arrest of the Gang of Four 
a. Deng’s Restoration 
b. “New Long March” 
7. Market Incentives 
a. Family Farms 
8. Openness Not an End in Itself 
9. “To Get Rich Is Glorious; To Strengthen the State Is Divine” 
a. Control of Resources 
C. THE “FOUR ABSOLUTES”  (66-67) 
1. Four Absolutes 
2. Tiananmen Square 
a. June 4, 1989 
3. Renewed Submission 
4. Paradox of Deng Xiaoping 
5. Economic vs. Political Debate 
a. Economic Debate Deals with the Means of Power and Is Open 
b. Political Debate Deals with the Ends of Power and Is Closed 
c. Jiang Zemin vs. Zhao Ziyang 
D. HEGEMONY UNDER DENG  (67-70) 
1. Deng’s Character 
a. Conviction of Chinese Superiority 
2. Hong Kong 
a. Margaret Thatcher 
3. Three-Legged Stool Rejected 
4. One Country, Two Systems 
5. Overseas Chinese 
a. Chinese Refugees from Vietnam 
b. 1979 Invasion 
6. Two Lessons 
E. PLAYING THE AMERICA CARD  (70-72) 
1. Balancing Strategy 
a. Sino-American Condominium 
2. Deng’s Skepticism 
a. Kissinger’s Overwrought Claims 
3. American Interventionism 
4. China’s Self-Sufficiency 
5. Kissinger’s Overblown Expectations 
6. Improved Sino-Soviet Relations 
F. THE CURRENT LEADERSHIP  (72-75) 
1. Post-Tiananmen Leadership 
2. Autocracy 
a. 1998 Crackdown 
3. Policy Initiatives of Jiang Zemin 
4. Generals’ Protest 
5. Zhu Rongji 
6. Open Society Rejected 
7. Economic Transformation 
8. Party-State 
9. Ideology 
a. Autocratic Traditions Will Remain Intact with the Death of Communism 
G. GREAT HAN CHAUVINISM  (75-81) 
1. Search for Alternative Sources of Legitimacy 
a. Economic Development 
b. Nationalism 
c. Rectifying the Names 
2. Great Han Chauvinism 
a. Reinvention of the Ruling Party 
3. Mobilization of the Educational System 
4. Guoping 
5. Patriotic Education 
a. Xenophobia 
6. Simple Morality Tales 
a. Taiping Rebellion 
b. Boxer Rebellion 
7. Patriotic Education Policy 
a. Historical Meta-narrative 
8. Chinese Mein Kampf 
9. Drumbeat of Party Propaganda 
10. Sycophancy of Intellectuals 
11. Jingoism 
12. Embassy Bombing 
H. THE HEGEMON REARMED  (81-88) 
1. Military Spending 
a. Major Military Expansion 
2. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization 
a. 863 Program 
3. Arms Purchases 
4. Sixteen Character Policy 
5. Cox Report 
6. Hidden Military Budget 
7. Phenomenal Economic Growth 
a. Military Being Readied to Take the Offensive 
8. PLA Air Force 
9. PLA Navy 
10. Missile Forces 
I. PLA CORRUPTION OR BUSINESS AS USUAL?  (89-94) 
1. PLA Self-Sufficiency 
2. Global Shopping Spree 
3. Russia: China’s Chief Supplier 
4. Recruitment of Russian Technicians 
5. Espionage 
a. Dual-Use Technology Transfer 
6. Loral and Hughes 
7. Cox Report 
8. U. S. Nuclear Weapons Labs 
9. MIRV-ing Technology 
10. Neutron Bomb 
11. Encryption Technology 
12. Five-Axis Profiling Technology 
13. Stolen Weapons Technology 
J. THE HEGEMON LOOKS ABROAD  (94-95) 
1. Military Projections 
2. Unspoken Goal of China’s Leadership 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. Why was Mao a failure on his own terms?   What are some of China’s unresolved 
  irredentist claims?  What was Mao’s primal mistake?  Would Deng Xiaoping have agreed 
that Mao was mistaken?  How was he able to survive two falls from grace?  What happened in 
his struggle with the Maoist radicals [the Gang of Four, led by “the white-boned demon,” Jiang 
Qing, Mao’s widow]?  (61-65) 
 
2. How does the fundamental difference between the economic debate and the political debate 
reflect the difference between the Four Modernizations and the Four Absolutes?  If Deng 
Xiaoping is a “paradox,” how is it resolved [this assumes the question is “either-or” when instead 
the “paradox” may be a dialectical “both-and”]?  What is known about his character?  How is “one 
country, two systems” in Hong Kong consistent with this 
dialectic?  What lessons may be drawn from the PLA’s attack on Vietnam in 1979?  (65-70) 
 
In Modern Times (1983), Paul Johnson suggested an even deeper motivation.  
Teng [Deng], he noted,  
 
“despised people for whom politics was the only thing in life that mattered,” “had 
nothing bur contempt for proletarian art,” and “wanted an end to the ‘shouting 
and yelling.’  The country must get back to work again. . . . Teng, in short, was an 
old-fashioned, reactionary disciplinarian in his late seventies, who believed in law 
and order and hard work.  He promptly sent the army into Vietnam, partly to 
punish the Vietnamese pro-Soviet leadership for persecuting its Chinese 
minority, but mainly to teach the PLA that life was a serious business: 
undisciplined units were put in the van and suffered appalling casualties.  That 
done, he set about clearing up some of the mess Mao’s long reign had left 
behind in the economy.  It was now admitted publicly that the Mao era had been 
characterized, not by the puritanical austerity of which it had boasted, but by 
appalling corruption in high places.  The Peking People’s Daily apologized to 
readers for ‘all the lies and distortions’ it had carried and, more remarkably, 
warned them against ‘the false, boastful and untrue reports’ which it ‘still often 
prints.’”  (565-66) 
 
In The Future of China after Mao (1978), Ross Terrill adds some interesting 
quotations from Teng Hsiao-ping in an appendix (Johnson’s source).  Here is a 
sampling: 
 
At a Red Guard rally in 1966:  “My thinking and conduct ran afoul of Mao Tse-
tung Thought.  My divorce from the masses demonstrated clearly that I was not 
fit for leadership work entrusted by the Central Committee.” 
 
On education following the Cultural Revolution: “Hou Pao-lin [a comic dialogue 
entertainer] once very aptly remarked that primary school pupils carry one pen, 
high school boys carry two, college students carry three, and illiterate ones carry 
four.  Most college students now carry nothing but one pen for wall poster 
painting.  They can’t do anything else.” 
 
At a student meeting in the Spring of 1976 that led to his second internal exile:  “I 
am an old man, and my hearing is not very good; I don’t hear a word of what you 
say.” 
 
His first speech before the CCP Congress after his second rehabilitation, August 
1977:  “There must be less empty talk and more hard work.” 
 
3. How successful was Henry Kissinger in dealing with Deng?  What have been the results of 
Deng’s reforms and the character of today’s leadership?  If the official ideology of communism is 
in retreat, what is taking its place?  What is guoqing?  How is Patriotic Education designed to 
enhance the prestige of the state?  (70-81) 
 
4. How is China building up its military even as it modernizes its economy?   How is it acquiring a 
technological advantage?  What is the goal of China’s leadership?  (81-95) 
 
Review 
 
irredentist claims  Mao’s primal mistake  Deng Xiaoping 
Great Leap Forward  Liu Shaoqi   Cultural Revolution 
Four Modernizations  Gang of Four   Four Absolutes 
Deng’s character  Margaret Thatcher  one country, two systems 
Henry Kissinger’s expectation Jiang Zemin   guoqing 
Taiping Rebellion  Boxer Rebellion   Patriotic Education policy 
(major military expansion hidden military budget  “active defense”) 
(espionage    Cox Report   stolen weapons technology) 
 
CHAPTER FIVE:  WORLD MAP OF HEGEMONY 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. How does Mosher expect China to try to recover its lost territories and tributaries?  What phases 
does he anticipate?  How did the democratization of Taiwan upset Chinese calculations?  What 
makes Beijing hesitate?  In confronting the United States, what are China’s advantages?  How 
does China practice “the politics of historical revenge”?  What are some of the stepping stones of 
Chinese expansion?  (97-106) 
  
2. Why may the qiaobao be considered Chinese assets?  How would you characterize China’s 
relationship with such neighbors as Russia, Mongolia, the Central Asian Republics, North Korea, 
and Southeast Asia?  What role is played by the qiaobao in Malaysia, Thailand, and other 
countries?  (106-12) 
 
3. On a larger scale, what are some of the challenges facing the Philippines, Indonesia, and India?  
What scenarios does the author explore?  (112-16) 
 
Review 
 
(all-azimuth power projection democratization of Taiwan China’s advantages over U.S.) 
(politics of historical revenge verbal bullying   voracious appetite for energy) 
Mischief Reef and the Spratlys overseas Chinese (qiaobao) Chinese emigration to Siberia 
Mongolia and Central Asia interest in energy resources Korean Question 
(anti-Japanese sentiments Vietnamese hostility)  Myanmar (Burma) 
Malaysia’s bridge compatriots Thailand   global hegemony 
(Gujral’s complaint  strategic interests: Russia and Japan) 
 
CHAPTER SIX:  WUWEI IS NO WAY 
 
Outline 
 
A. DAOIST DOCTRINE OF WUWEI: DOING NOTHING, DELIBERATELY  (117-18) 
1. Idea of Moral Equivalence 
2. China as a State of Mind 
3. Motivations of Those Who Promote Wuwei  
B. MYTH: COMMUNISM IS MORIBUND ANDDEMOCRACY IS THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE  
(118-20) 
1. “End of History” Idea [Francis Fukuyama] 
2. Death of Hu Yaobang 
3. Tiananmen Square 
4. Martial Law Provoked Mass Demonstrations 
5. Crushing of the Dissident Movement 
6. Present Generation of Students 
C. MYTH: THE RISE OF MARKET FORCES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE WILL TRANSFORM 
CHINA INTO A FREE-MARKET DEMOCRACY  (120-23) 
1. Reactions to the Massacre 
2. Debate over Revoking Most Favorable Nation Status [Normal Trade Relations] 
3. Coexistence of Capitalism and Oppression 
a. Inadequacy of the Sullivan Principle 
4. Political vs. Economic Freedom 
5. Crony Capitalism 
a. Suharto Family 
6. Princelings 
7. Communist Kleptocracy 
D. MYTH: THE PULL OF AMERICAN CULTURE WILL MAKE CHINA INTO THE MIRROR IMAGE 
OF THE UNITED STATES  (123-25) 
1. Spread of American Pop Culture 
2. Chinese Students in the United States 
3. Chinese Cyclical View of History vs. Western Linear View 
a. Chinese Students Admired United States for Utilitarian, Not Idealistic, Reasons 
b. Pre-1989 Infatuation with the Democratic Superpower 
4. Russia’s Problems Blamed on Democracy  
E. MYTH: THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNET WILL CHANGE CHINA  
(125-28) 
1. Book Publishing 
2. Language’s Magic Circle of Meaning (Edward Sapir) 
3. The Arts 
4. Self-Censorship by Writers 
a. Symbiotic Relationship between State and Writer 
5. Individualism 
a. Li Zongwu 
6. Internet 
a. Computer Viruses 
F. MYTH:  OUR OWN FEARS BLIND US TO THE FACT THAT CHINA HAS ALREADY CHANGED  
(128-29) 
1. New “Cold War” 
2. Multilateral Framework Unlikely to Check Chinese Ambitions 
3. China’s Unspoken Goal 
G. CLINTON’S “STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP”  (129-38) 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What is meant by the Daoist (Taoist) doctrine of wuwei?  Why do China experts in the West do 
China’s bidding?   Identify five myths and eaxmine the evidence against them.  (117-29) 
 
2. What made the “kowtowing” involved in Clinton’s strategic partnership not only embarrassing but 
dangerous to the United States?  What were some of the “lowlights” of his tour of China?  What 
did Jiang get out of the press conference?  What were the three “no’s,” which are now binding on 
future administrations?  What view is taken by such former top officials as Henry Kissinger and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski?  (120-38) 
 
Review 
 
Daoist (Taoist) doctrine  idea of moral equivalence crushing of dissident movement 
political vs. economic freedom crony capitalism  princelings 
kleptocracy   (cyclical view of history  utilitarian attitudes) 
(self-censorship by writers) Clinton’s strategic partnership Tiananmen welcome ceremony  
(Clinton’s argument for rights) the three no’s   (joint press conference) 
Kissinger and Brzezinski 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONTAINING THE HEGEMON 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. What were the beginnings of current U.S. policy towards China?  How did Clinton’s strategic 
partnership flow naturally from this earlier precedent?  Rather than fostering stability, where did 
Clinton’s incentives lead?  What course of action does the author recommend?  How have former 
U.S. officials profited from their China contacts?  What needs to be done about technology 
transfer?  (139-44) 
 
2. What do Chinese strategists believe about the United States?  How can the United States create 
“situations of strength”?  How can the United States promote the peaceful evolution of the 
Chinese system?  What makes Taiwan so critical to this endeavor?  (144-57)   
 
Review 
 
Kissinger’s concession  (subversion of 1996 elections Falun Gong) 
containment strategy  China profiteering  situations of strength 
rollback vs. peaceful evolution (Jackson-Vanik Amendment Sun Yat-sen) 
(Republic of China  Chiang Kai-shek  [Jiang Jeshi] proto-civil society) 
(Chiang Ching-kuo) 
 
AFTERWORD 
 
Study Questions 
 
1. How are the attitudes of China watchers changing? 
 
Review 
 
(Song Yongyi) 
